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Innovations spur science-based trade and industrial development in a fast changing pace 
of globalization. Knowledge accumulation and diffusion have been increasingly 
recognised as fundamental factors that play an important role in long-run economic 
growth. This paper focuses on the long-term innovation strategy of industrial and 
technological development in developing countries. Growth theory, empirical evidence 
and several indicators of innovation have been pressed into service to draw important 
lessons from historical experience of the developed and newly industrializing countries 
for the industrial development of the developing economies. Technology development 
and public technology policy experience of the East Asian countries have been 
examined to reinvent the role of public technology policy that can be adopted to develop 
national innovation system to nurture and build innovative capabilities in the developing 
economies in the dynamic global economy. 
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1 Introduction 
The knowledge base in the major economies has been growing at a fast pace. 
Investment in knowledge accounts for about 4.7 per cent of OECD-wide GDP and the 
high-knowledge-based economies invest between 5.2 to 6.5 per cent of GDP in 
knowledge development (OECD 2001). Developed and newly industrializing countries 
internationally trade goods and services which are knowledge-intensive. The industrial 
growth patterns and competitiveness of industries across countries and over time are 
closely related in the globalizing world. Two distinct patterns of industrial development 
are clearly noticeable: developed and newly industrializing countries moved faster 
towards producing and exporting goods and services which are knowledge intensive; a 
large number of countries could not catch up and their position in the fast globalizing 
world is being marginalized (Lall 2004). This pattern of industrial growth can be traced 
from the changing roles of innovative investment patterns in industry across countries 
and over time. The processes of globalization have affected different innovative 
activities differently and thus the rise/fall of innovative investment in some industries in 
some of the countries. Outsourcing of industrial R&D has shifted some of the 
innovative activities from developed to a few developing countries. The increasing role 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) and direct operation of multinational corporations in 
production of goods and services in the developing countries has significantly 
influenced development/underdevelopment of innovative capabilities. Developing 
countries under the new international economic order have substantially reduced the 
role of the state in innovative investment and have promoted the dependence on either 
private initiatives or on FDI. Therefore, it is legitimate to inquire the changes in the 
pattern of industrial innovative investment on trade and industrial development which 
are occurring across countries and over time. 
 
Asian countries (South East Asia, China and India) have shown dynamism, in terms of 
industrial development and contributing to global trade with high-tech exports, in the 
fast globalizing world. East Asian economies followed a standard pattern of economic 
transformation and achieved more than a 9 per cent growth rate during the decades of 
the 1980s and 1990s in the twentieth century. The industrial sector is truly the engine of 
growth of these economies contrary to the service sector-led economic growth in the 
case of other economies. The industrial growth experience of East Asia remained highly 
controversial on two counts. One, capital accumulation versus technical progress which 
of the factors that have allowed East Asia to achieve a faster rate of industrial growth. 
Two, the role of the state in enacting suitable policies for industrial development or the 
market forces which led the East Asia to succeed in economic transformation as well as 
in the international market. Thus Asian countries are most suitable to test new economic 
growth theory and draw lessons from successful public policy experience for other 
stagnant economies. This paper is an attempt in that direction and is organized in seven 
sections. Apart from the introductory section, a review of the growth theory and   2
empirical literature is presented in Section 2. Sources and indicators of innovations 
across regions and continents are presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains the growth 
pattern of industrial R&D expenditure across major developed and developing 
economies. Analysis of the indicators and sources of innovations across Asian countries 
is presented in Section 5. The role of public innovation policy in a rapidly globalizing 
world economy to achieve rapid industrial development in developing countries is 
presented in Section 6. In the final section, we have drawn lessons from the innovative 
public intervention in technology development of the East Asian countries for other less 
developed countries in general and for South Asian countries in particular.  
2  Knowledge accumulation and economic growth: theory and empirics  
Technological knowledge accumulation is now being widely acknowledged and 
acclaimed as a source of economic growth. Differentials in the level and growth of 
income across countries and over time are being increasingly recognized due to 
knowledge accumulation differences. The evolution of the sources of economic growth 
can be seen through the development of the long-run theory of economic growth which 
has been developed after the Great Depression in the twentieth century in three waves 
(Ruttan 2001). The first wave was initiated by the work of Harrod (1939) and Domar 
(1946). Solow (1956, 1957) and Swan (1956) developed a model of long-run growth in 
neoclassical tradition that stimulated the second wave. More recently, the third wave 
was stimulated in the mid 1980s by the writings of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). 
 
Modern theory of economic growth has recognized the dominant role of technological 
knowledge as a determinant of economic performance. The superior economic 
performance across countries and over time has been essentially attributed to the 
proportion of knowledge accumulation (Solow 1956, 1957). Knowledge accumulation 
and its growth have been attributed to be determined by the exogenous factors and seem 
to be the fundamental responsibility of the state. Thus, the agents of production are the 
receivers of new knowledge which is external to their circumstances. Since knowledge 
has global public good property and is universally accessible, therefore, the tendency is 
towards convergence of productivity and overall economic growth. Contrary to this, the 
evolutionary growth theory has recognized the cost of acquiring new knowledge as well 
as benefits of accumulation of knowledge which is path dependent. This signifies that 
knowledge accumulation and generation not only is endogenous but also assumes 
capability building. These capabilities ultimately allow economic agents of production 
to reap the benefits of being leaders in innovations that matter in the markets. Therefore, 
the prediction of the theory is that the level of development and growth is historically 
determined. Those countries and industries which invest more in knowledge 
accumulation and generation will stay ahead compared with others (Ruttan 2001). 
 
New growth theory, which is popularly known as ‘endogenous growth theory’, not only 
recognized the importance of knowledge accumulation for economic growth but   3
successfully modelled the commercially oriented innovative investment. Sources of 
knowledge generation were fundamentally endogenous and were driven by the 
commercial interest. An important characteristic of this kind of economic thinking is 
that knowledge accumulation and generation give birth to increasing returns to scale of 
an important scarce factor that is capital accumulation. However, knowledge 
accumulation in these kinds of models itself is susceptible to diminishing returns to 
scale (Romer 1986). Another property of endogenous knowledge accumulation is that it 
is non-rival and partially excludable and thus generates significant amount of 
externalities. It has been argued that knowledge is expensive to develop but is 
inexpensive to use which underline the importance of scale effects. The value of 
knowledge increases with the increase in the size of the market (Romer 1993, 1997). 
Thus, the model predicts that those who invest more in knowledge generation and 
accumulation will grow at a faster rate and those who do not will continue to persist and 
stay backward.  
 
An important implication of this kind of economic thinking is that knowledge exhibits 
public good property which is not completely appropriable through market transactions 
by the private agents of production. Thus, private agents of production have a tendency 
to underinvest and consequently underline the role of public policy to address this gap. 
The other important implication of Romer-Lucas stimulated endogenous growth 
literature is that there is incentive to enhance the quality of human and physical capital 
that has a capacity to raise permanently economic growth rate and level of per capita 
income. Thus, the activist technology policy pursued by the government to enhance 
quality of human and physical capital has a capacity to permanently raise not just the 
per capita income but the long-run rate of economic growth (Verspagen 1992). 
 
Empirical literature, which draws inspiration from endogenous growth models, on the 
knowledge generation and diffusion—both domestic and international—has grown 
recently by leaps and bounds. A seminal contribution to empirical literature which 
establishes the relationship between total factor productivity and stocks of measured 
knowledge has been made by Coe and Helpman (1995). The authors have selected 
OECD countries and Israel to empirically verify the relationship between superior 
economic performance and cumulated stock of technological knowledge. They have 
also established the interdependence, in terms of technological knowledge, among the 
developed countries and technological knowledge of the trading partner for smaller 
economies has been more important compared to that of the domestic knowledge. Trade 
has a capacity to transmit superior knowledge across national boundaries that matter for 
economic growth. However, the domestic knowledge in the large countries has recorded 
higher elasticity than that of the foreign knowledge. These results were confirmed while 
extending the scope of the study to include 77 developing countries in the sample (Coe 
et al. 1997). An important conclusion which emerged from the above mentioned study 
is that trade is the most important vehicle of knowledge diffusion across countries, and   4
developing countries do benefit substantially from the innovations generated by the 
industrially advanced countries. 
 
This revealing new evidence generated controversy and scepticism with regard to the 
validity of the evidence and thus resulted in a spurt in empirical literature on foreign 
knowledge spillovers (Keller 2004; Navaretti and Tarr 2000). The sceptics re-estimated 
after introducing the refinements in the Coe and Helpman estimates for the sample of 
OECD countries but endorsed the results more empathetically.1 Contrary to this, 
Evenson and Singh (1997) in a sample of eleven Asian countries during the period 
1970-93 found higher elasticity of domestic knowledge stock compared to foreign. 
However, East Asian countries did have higher impact of foreign knowledge transmitted 
through international trade. Somewhat similar empirical results were reported by Kim 
(2000) from the analysis of the East Asian countries during the period 1971-93. 
Transmission of technological knowledge to developing countries through trade 
literature has almost completely ignored the role of domestic technological capabilities 
which facilitates the adaptation of foreign knowledge barring a few. 
 
FDI, at least in theory, has been widely recognized as the most important source of 
diffusion of technological knowledge across national boundaries. Flexible 
manufacturing system has opened up ample opportunities, where a firm superior in 
technology can subcontract some of its operations to save costs and in the process can 
also transfer technical know-how to local firms. This is being done to maintain the 
required quality control of the processes of production of the local firm. Therefore, it 
was expected that substantial learning can occur and improve productivity of domestic 
firms. However, recent studies do not confirm the expected relationship between 
productivity growth and knowledge diffusion through FDI.2 A more recent literature 
does report from micro empirical studies some positive relationship for developed 
countries.3 Domestic firms which have substantial technological capabilities are able to 
catch knowledge spillovers and raise productivity and those who do not have 
capabilities have negative productivity effects.4 FDI at the most can supplement the 
domestic technological capabilities, but alone can not engineer innovations in the host 
country. Knowledge spillovers across countries and industries, as the major source of 
growth predicted by the endogenous growth literature, are fundamentally dependent on 
domestic technological capabilities and the stage of industrial development. As soon as 
a country’s economic agents of production reach close to technology frontier, 
knowledge spillovers as a source of productivity growth cease to exist because 
knowledge at that level becomes more and more tacit (Stiglitz 2003; Singh 2004a). 
                                                 
1 Keller (1998); Lichtenberg and Potterie (1998). 
2 Keller (2004); Hanson (2001); Gorg and Greenaway (2002). 
3 Keller (2004). 
4 Girma (2005); Siddharthan (2004).   5
3  Sources and indicators of innovations in the global economy 
There are two main indicators of measurement of innovations that is input and output. 
Research and development expenditure is the input measure of innovation. Patents 
registered, scientific research papers published in recognized international journals and 
high-tech trade are the output measures of innovations. These indicators which generate 
innovations and outcomes that can be realized through commercial operations are 
presented in Table 1. The generation of innovations has been widely acknowledged as 
dependent on the innovative investment in the global economy. Total R&D expenditure 
incurred in the global economy has increased from 409.8 billion PPP dollars in 1990 to 
755.1 billion PPP dollars in 1999-2000. Industrially advanced countries expended 367.9 
billion PPP dollars in 1990 which was nearly 90 per cent of the total global R&D 
expenditure. The expenditure on R&D increased to 596.7 billion PPP dollars in 1999-
2000 but the relative share comes out to be 79 per cent of the global R&D. This clearly 
shows that despite the absolute rise in the R&D expenditure of the developed countries, 
their share in relative terms has dwindled 11 percentage points during the last decade of 
the twentieth century. Developing countries, on the other hand, increased innovative 
efforts and raised their relative share from 10 per cent in 1990 to 21 per cent in the year 
2000. This trend clearly shows reduction of concentration of innovative efforts in the 
still highly inequitable knowledge-based economy. The rise in the share of R&D of the 
developing countries in the global R&D is mainly due to the big push in innovative 
efforts of East Asian countries.  
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Table 1 clearly shows that the hub of innovative activities is North America which has 
highest R&D intensity. The USA is the largest both in absolute level and in relative 
terms so far as innovative investment is concerned. The Asian continent is also 
emerging as a hub of both economic and innovative activities. R&D expenditure 
increased from US$94.2 billion in 1990 to US$235.6 billion in 2000, which is slightly 
more than a two-fold increase within a decade. Asian R&D expenditure increased faster 
compared to other regions and improved its relative position from third to second in the 
global reckoning. Asian countries accounted for 23 per cent of the global innovative 
investment expenditure in 1990 which increased to 30.9 per cent in 2000. Europe lagged 
behind because of decline in R&D expenditure in the East European countries. Two 
noteworthy facts here are: one, South East Asia and China substantially raised 
innovative investment expenditure and globally commercial/private sector stakes in 
innovative investment increased substantially; and two, R&D intensities either slightly 
declined or remained stagnant across regions except in North America where it 
improved slightly. 
 
The innovative efforts over a period of time have developed a system in which 
economic agents of production participate, learn to use, and acquire knowledge. This 
process has not only given birth to a national system of innovation, but also nurtured 
economic agents of production to be pioneers in exploiting new opportunities and 
strongly built international comparative advantage. Therefore, there is a positive 
relationship between the innovative investment and the outcomes of innovations. 
Industrially advanced countries not only spend higher proportion of R&D resources but 
also publish more than the 85 per cent of the global scientific papers published in 
scientific and technical journals. This clearly shows that national innovation system 
takes time to develop and the innovative outcomes lagged behind compared to the 
innovative investment.  
 
Developing countries increased their share in innovative investment, however, the 
proportion of scientific and technical papers published in the journals remained 
substantially lower, that is, the share of R&D expenditure is 21 per cent and share of 
papers published is nearly two per cent in 1999. The share of North America and 
Europe for published scientific and technical papers in journals was 35 per cent and 23 
per cent respectively in 1999. However, Asia published only 22,824 scientific and 
technical papers, which is about 4 per cent of the global figure (Table 1). This clearly 
brings out the concentration of production of new ideas in terms of scientific and 
technical papers in the developed countries. Thus, the contribution made by the 
developed countries towards the global pool of knowledge is amazingly high and the 
expansion of knowledge frontiers is largely conditioned by the evolution of the national 
innovation systems which is highly dependent on the history of innovative investment. 
It is expected that the contribution towards the expansion of new knowledge will be 
substantial from the Asian continent due to the speed at which resources devoted to 
innovative investment have increased in the recent past.   8
New scientific and technical knowledge which has commercial utility is being 
increasingly patented for producing goods and services to enhance comparative 
advantage of the nations. This indicator of innovation clearly shows the concentration of 
patent applications filed in the USA patent office by the developed countries. Out of 
total patent applications filed in 2001, the developed countries accounted for 91 per cent 
of global patent applications (Table 1). The concentration of innovations in developed 
countries further increases to 94.3 per cent if we take USA patents registered from 1977 
to 2000 (Singh 2004b). However, the share of the developing countries in patenting of 
new ideas is not only meagre but the extent of the conversion of patent to commercial 
innovations may also be small. Even the conversion ratio of patent to innovations within 
the USA economy in 1982 was 57 per cent in Silicon Valley, 35 per cent in Boston and 
0.3 per cent in Albany/Schenectady/Troy (New York), which clearly shows wide 
variations of patent to innovations conversion ratio across regions (Branscomb 2004). It 
is important to note here that patents have been largely concentrated in North America; 
Europe and Asian countries have filed just 3.27 per cent of the global patent 
applications filed in 2001.  
 
The fundamental aim of commercially oriented innovations is to perpetuate and enhance 
international competitive advantage so that new innovations can be expanded and 
exploited globally. The theory of international trade leads us to expect an international 
division of labour that the leaders of innovations (developed countries) export high 
technology goods and services, and the laggards (developing countries) continue to 
export raw materials and low-skill-based goods and services in the international 
economy (Archibugi and Pietrobelli 2003). The empirical literature on knowledge 
growth and trade specialization has clearly established the relationship between 
innovations and international trade specialization (Malerba and Montobbio 2000). 
 
High technology trade has grown at a faster rate during the last quarter of the twentieth 
century. Total global high-tech trade in 2000 was US$998 billion, that is 20 per cent of 
manufactured goods and services traded internationally (World Bank 2003). It is 
important to note here that high technology international trade is originating from the 
developed countries and is quite close to the prediction of the widely held wisdom of 
international trade theory. The share of high-tech trade of the developed countries in 
2000 was 88.3 per cent of the total global high-tech international trade in manufactured 
goods. However, developing country high-tech-based international trade was of the 
order of US$117 billion in 2000, nearly 12 per cent of the global high-tech-based 
international trade in manufactured products. Since a substantial amount of inter- and 
intra-industry trade theory and empirical evidence suggests that international trade is 
governed by multinational corporations, it may be that the high-tech trade originating 
from developing countries could actually belong to innovative firms of developed   9
countries producing in developing countries.5 North American countries are 
predominant as far as high-tech international trade is concerned and account for nearly 
27 per cent globally. Newly industrialized countries have been improving their position 
in international high-tech trade and accounted for 13 per cent of the global figure in 
2000 (Table 1). Growth experience of global international trade of manufactured goods 
and services reveals during 1985-2000 that developing countries recorded higher growth 
rates compared to developed countries (Table 2). The general pattern from the estimated 
growth rates of international trade reveals that high-tech exports increased at a faster 
rate compared to the resource-based medium- and low-technology-based exports. 
Exports of developing countries increased during 1985-2000 at a faster rate compared to 
developed countries. 
Table 2: Growth of high-tech and other manufactured exports across developed and 
developing countries (1985-2000) 




Resource based  6.60  5.18  11.00 
Low technology  8.85  6.86  11.69 
Medium technology  8.45  7.57  13.36 
High technology  13.19  11.13  19.21 
Source: adapted from Lall (2004); and World Bank (2004). 
 
FDI has been advocated as a panacea for the ills of the less developed countries. Apart 
from filling the gap of investment resources, FDI is also expected to bring in new 
management and technical innovations as well as new practices which help push up 
efficiency levels of domestic firms. Global FDI inflows decreased by 41 per cent in 
2001, and were US$651 billion in 2002. The share of global FDI outflows originating 
from developed countries was nearly 75 per cent in 2001 (Table 1). European and North 
American countries contribute largely to the global FDI outflows. A noteworthy feature 
of global FDI inflows is that 72 per cent of the flows are being received by the 
developed countries themselves. Developing countries are receiving just 25 per cent of 
global FDI flows. Asia and the Pacific countries are receiving more than 51 per cent of 
developing countries FDI inflows. Among the Asian countries, China alone has been 
receiving 44 per cent of Asian and Pacific FDI inflows. This evidence clearly shows the 
high degree of concentration of FDI inflows in certain locations, and thus in general can 
be considered as a definite source which can fill the gap of developing economies 
investment requirements. The relationship of FDI and innovations does not seem to hold 
as multinational corporations do not locate strategic R&D away from home locations. 
They do undertake some R&D in developing countries, but not much. In the mid 1990s 
R&D performed in developing country affiliates as reported by USA-based 
                                                 
5 Amable (2000); Urata (2001).   10
multinational corporations came to 8 per cent of total R&D of the affiliates; just one per 
cent of parent company R&D. The R&D expenditure incurred by multinational 
corporations (MNCs) away from home location at the most is adaptation of the existing 
products to the local conditions.6 Even the technological spillovers to local firms 
benefits only if the firms have enough technological capabilities to catch up the 
complex and tacit elements of technological knowledge. Otherwise the presence of FDI 
in developing countries adversely affects the technological performance of local firms.7 
 
Royalty payments received in terms of technology transfer is an important indicator of 
technology-generating countries. Global technology and licensing fees from technology 
transfer was nearly US$80 billion. The share of developing countries of the global 
revenue generated from technology and licensing fees in 2002 was more than 98 per 
cent. Thus, it shows a very high degree of concentration of revenue received. This 
implies that developed countries produce technologies, and developing countries are 
receivers of technological knowledge and know-how. On the whole, indicators, both 
input and output, of global innovations reveal a high degree of concentration of 
innovations in the developed countries.  
4  Trends in industrial R&D expenditure across countries 
Commercially oriented innovative investment has largely been done by the industrial 
sector of the countries with a view to securing profits from the markets both domestic 
and international. The industrial research and development expenditure of the selected 
17 countries for analysis (Table 3) has grown steadily over the period of 1977 to 2000 at 
rate of 3.87 per cent per annum. Total resources expended by these countries increased 
from PPP US$117.4 billion in 1977 to PPP US$289.6 billion in 2000. It is important to 
note here that more than 53 per cent of industrial expenditure was incurred by USA 
industry in 1977. US industrial R&D expenditure has steadily grown at 2.64 per cent per 
annum and absolute expenditure increased from US$62 billion in 1977 to US$118 
billion in 2000. USA industries dominated the high-tech markets, however the relative 
share of industrial R&D dwindled to 40.78 per cent in 2000.  
 
Industrial R&D expenditure of three European countries recorded in Table 3 negative 
trends during the period 1977 to 2000. These are Ireland (-4.10 per cent), Italy (-1.43 
per cent) and the UK (-0.55 per cent). Deceleration of industrial R&D expenditure has 
substantially reduced the relative shares and position of these three countries among the 
17 countries during the period 1977-2000. Shift factors may have played an important 
 
                                                 
6 UNCTAD (1999: 195-228); Evenson and Westphal (1995). 
7 UNCTAD (1999); Siddharthan (2004)   11
Table 3: Growth and structure of industrial R&D expenditure across countries 
 
Country 
1977 million PPP$ 
at 1995 prices 
 
Rank 
2000 million PPP$ 
at 1995 prices 
 
Rank 





























































































Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages. 
Source: OECD (2002); Government of India (2003); KITA (2002). 
 
role in reducing the industrial R&D expenditure of UK and Italy, that is, there appears 
to be a race to transform the economies from producers of industrial goods to 
knowledge-based economies. Thus the substitution effect seems to have played 
dominant role, but relocating industrial activities to cheaper labour cost locations could   12
be an explanation. Ireland has chosen to be dependent for industrial development on the 
FDI. All other European countries have shown rising trends in their industrial R&D 
expenditures. It is significant to note that the European countries, who have expended 
smaller amounts of R&D in industry beginning with the initial period, have shown 
faster rates of industrial R&D expenditure during the period of study. This clearly 
shows trend towards convergence across the European economies. Overall R&D 
expenditure has been empirically tested and an overall trend was found of convergence 
across European regions. However, private R&D expenditure has shown clearly wide 
dispersion across European economies (Martin et al. 2004). 
 
Asian economies have surprisingly shown very high industrial R&D expenditure growth 
during the period 1977-2000. Japan’s industrial R&D expenditure increased at a rate of 
9.52 per cent per annum during the study period. Its relative position improved from 
fifth to second with shares jumping from 7.16 in 1977 to 23.13 in 2000. South Korea 
recorded highest rate of growth in industrial R&D at 16.51 per cent per annum. This 
enabled the country’s industrial R&D expenditure relative share to improve from a mere 
0.31 per cent in 1977 to 3.38 per cent in 2000, jumping in rank from thirteenth to sixth 
position in the last quarter of the twentieth century. India’s industrial R&D expenditure 
has grown at a rate of 7.82 per cent per annum and could marginally improve its relative 
share and position (Table 3). A noteworthy feature that emerges from the foregoing 
analysis is that the three Asian economies have shown substantial growth in industrial 
R&D expenditure. 
 
So far as sources of industrial R&D expenditure are concerned, there is a trend toward a 
greater role of the private sector across countries and more so in the case of East Asian 
economies. The role of the private sector in India’s industry has increased substantially. 
The share of private industrial R&D expenditure, which was nearly 55 per cent in 1980-
81, has increased substantially during the period of fast globalization to 81 per cent. The 
real public sector R&D expenditure has decreased and recorded negative growth rate 
during the last decade of the twentieth century (Singh 2001). This tells about the role of 
state in downsizing the public sector economic activities. India’s high-tech draw in a 
substantial amount of innovative investment amounting to nearly 70 per cent of the total 
industrial R&D expenditure during 1998-99.8 Intensity of industrial R&D is 
substantially higher in the private sector high-tech industries compared with the public 
sector. However, defence-related industries have high R&D expenditure compared with 
civilian industries. Private sector industrial R&D is concentrated in the Maharashtra 
state (52 per cent) and Karnataka state is continuously able to corner a substantial 
proportion of public sector industrial R&D (36 per cent). The structure of India’s 
industrial R&D expenditure is quite shallow and highly concentrated in few industries 
and within two states. 
                                                 
8 Government of India (2003).   13
The industrial R&D expenditure pattern has a bearing on industrial activities. During 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, a rapid rise in innovation investment caused a 
significant shift in the structure of industrial activities in the global economy. The 
industrial production and trade in high-tech activities has expanded at a faster rate 
compared with other manufacturing activities. High-tech industrial performance is 
highly correlated with high-tech R&D expenditure. Japan has the highest R&D 
expenditure in high-tech industrial activities. Japan and Korea are ranked first and 
seventh respectively among the 26 countries examined by Lall (2004), exporting high-
tech products above US$5 billion in 1998. Other Asian countries which figure among 
the high-tech R&D expenditure per unit of exports are Taiwan (18th), China (19th), 
Singapore (21st), Malaysia (23rd), Hong Kong (24th), Thailand (25th) and the 
Philippines (26th). The rest of the ranks, in terms of high-tech R&D per unit of high-
tech exports, were occupied by developed countries.  
 
There are two distinct sets of countries which are engaged in high-tech manufacturing 
activities: (1) countries where the high-tech industrial R&D expenditure per unit of 
exports is being incurred by the domestic firms (Japan comes under this category); and 
(2) countries where the high-tech industrial R&D expenditure is dependent on 
transnational corporations for their high-tech industrial production and exports 
(Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines come under this category). It is important to 
note here that there exists a strong positive relationship between domestic R&D 
expenditure and industrial performance. Lall (2004), using data of 75 countries for 1985 
and 1998, has provided consistent and robust estimates from the econometric model for 
the relationship between the domestic R&D expenditure and industrial performance. 
UNCTAD (2005) has found a high degree of correlation between economic growth and 
domestic innovation capability index. This suggests that innovative investment which 
generates domestic innovation capabilities is a precondition for the transformation of 
industrial structure and sustained economic growth of a developing economy. 
5  Sources and indicators of innovations across Asian countries 
The differences in innovation investment are substantial across Asian countries. South 
Asian countries are far behind in innovative investment efforts compared with the East 
Asian Countries (Table 4). Indicators of technology development and the technological 
outcomes, which are presented in Table 4, clearly point out that Taiwan and South 
Korea have moved ahead. These countries systematically built domestic capabilities 
over the last quarter of the twentieth century. South Korea is highest investor in 
innovation activities, incurring 3.0 per cent of GNP on R&D. Next to Korea is Taiwan 
with a R&D intensity of 2.08. Taiwan is leading in technology development and is 
globally ranked number 2 in terms of technology index. Science and technology-based 
manufactured exports from Taiwan constitutes 39 per cent of total manufactured 
exports. Singapore is unique in terms of succeeding in technology development on a 
model dependent heavily on FDI and is also able to combine domestic efforts to climb   14
the technological ladder. Its investment in R&D is 1.84 per cent of GDP, and 76 per 
cent of the manufactured exports are high-tech. Its global technology development 
ranking is 17
th. Malaysia is also quite successful in exporting high-tech manufactured 
goods and services which are solely dependent on FDI. However, domestic 
technological capabilities could not grow in the absence domestic innovative 
capabilities. Lately, China has raised substantially the investment in innovations and 
crossed the one per cent mark of GNP. The success of China in attracting FDI and 
international trade has been widely recognized, however the country’s global 
technological ranking based on technology index is 63. 





Share of R&D 
in GNP 
High-tech exports 






FDI in million 
US$ 2002 
Bangladesh  0.03 
(2000) 
0.00 79  47 
India  0.60 
(2000) 
5.00 57  3030 
Pakistan  0.92 
(1987) 
1.00 -  57 
Sri Lanka  0.3 1.00  67 242 
Indonesia  0.07 
(2000) 
16.00 65  -1513 
Rep. of Korea  3.0 
(2002) 
35.00 18  1972 
Malaysia  0.42 
(2000) 
59.00 26  3203 
Singapore  1.84 
(1999) 
63.00 17  6097 
Taiwan  2.08 
(2000) 
39.00 2 - 
Thailand  0.16 
(2001) 
32.00 41  900 
China  1.1 
(2002) 
23.00 63  49,308 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the year of availability of R&D expenditure. 
Sources: World Economic Forum (2003); UNDP (2004); World Bank (2004). 
 
Other East Asian countries are moving ahead in terms of raising technology as a factor 
in their respective economic development. Still, they lag behind as far as generating 
capabilities for development of technological knowledge is concerned. The international 
technological rankings of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia are quite low. Differential 
performance of East Asian countries in technology development clearly points out that 
there is no substitute of systematically building domestic technology development 
capabilities. FDI can perpetuate technological dependence and domestic agents of   15
production continuously upgrade and adopt technologies developed elsewhere. This in 
the long run depletes resources and cripples capabilities to become leaders in 
innovations because technology import involves substantial costs. The fundamental 
lesson obvious from successful East Asian countries—South Korea and Taiwan—is that 
strategic state intervention in enhancing innovative investment along with a 
selective/restrictive role of foreign direct invest helps in building national innovation 
systems.  
 
The East Asian success in technology development allows us to discern two distinct 
strategies. First, the international trade in high-tech products and industrial growth 
remained heavily dependent on FDI. The countries which followed this path are 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Technological ranking and domestic 
efforts in these countries have remained quite weak. National innovation systems, which 
increase competitiveness of domestic firms, remain quite fragile because domestic 
governments have relied more on foreign capital for technology. Recently, these 
governments have realised that without building national innovation system, despite 
using foreign sources of innovations more judicially, technology development and 
sustainability of industrial growth is not possible. Therefore, efforts have been stepped 
up to provide incentives to domestic firms to be innovative with better management of 
technology transfer through policy to spur local innovations. 
 
Second, South Korea and Taiwan from a very early stage have systematically started 
building their national innovation systems and have not relied purely on FDI. FDI was 
kept at arm’s length, but domestic firms were nurtured and encouraged by the 
government to succeed in the international market. These economies developed early on 
high quality human capital for simulative and adaptive learning capabilities for reverse 
engineering, creating a network of science and technological institutions that helped 
them understand the complex process of technological innovations. The later strategy 
for moving up the technology ladder has recently gained recognition of the role of 
technology policy in the fast pace of globalization.  
 
South Asian countries are slowly surging ahead on the technological ladders. India has 
been recognized as the tenth largest spender in absolute level innovation activities and is 
the most sought after place for location of R&D centres from the multinational 
corporations. When we look at hard data, India is ranked 57
th according to technology 
development index among the 80 nations for which comparable science and technology 
statistics are available. India’s share of R&D in GNP was just 0.6 in 2000. The decline 
in R&D intensity is attributed essentially to two factors. One, the faster rate of growth 
of national income during the 1990s. Two, the government’s contribution in R&D 
spending declined/stagnated in the wake of controlling the fiscal deficit. However, the 
science and technology-based share of manufactured exports has increased 
continuously. The share of high-tech manufactured exports is 5 per cent. When we 
compare India’s share of high-tech exports with East Asian countries the achievement is   16
miniscule. Despite this, India is well recognized globally in the pharmaceutical as well 
as information and communication technology-based products and innovations. 
 
The other major country in the South Asian region is Pakistan, which is a globally 
recognized nuclear power. From the civilian technology development point of view, its 
international recognition and contribution seems quite low. Pakistan’s share of high-
tech manufactured exports just 1 per cent. Another important indicator of technology 
development is the workforce engaged in R&D activities. Researchers engaged in R&D 
are 69 per population million which is quite low compared with other South Asian 
countries (Sri Lanka and India employed 191 and 157 researchers per million 
respectively). FDI flow, which is considered important source of technology transfer, is 
quite low in general in South Asian countries. Pakistan received US$57 million in FDI 
in 2000, which again is low compared with Sri Lanka and India. R&D intensity is 
nearly 1 per cent of the GNP of Pakistan which is much higher compared with other 
South Asian countries. Industrial enterprises in Pakistan hardly do any formal research 
and development expenditure (Lall 2000). 
6  State and innovations in the fast changing global economy 
East Asian economies surged ahead in the transformation process and succeeded in 
industrializing their economies as well as building innovation capabilities during the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. The emergence of East Asia as a hub of economic 
activity generated controversy with regard to whether governments or markets were the 
central factor in the successful economic transformation. However, the early attempt to 
describe the government’s innovative role to enact interventionist policies which led 
private agents of production to succeed in the fast pace of globalization has been 
described as minority view.9 It is important to note here that the 1997 East Asian crisis 
has changed the thinking among economists and international agencies with regard to 
the role of state in policy making and conducting development programmes. The 1997 
crisis severely affected the stability of economic growth in general and innovative 
outcomes in particular of the region’s economies, which has led to the renewal of the 
role of the state in terms of good governance.  
 
Stern (2004) has recently emphasised that one important policy lesson which can be 
drawn from the five decades of development experience is that the state and markets 
complement each other. The World Development Report 199810 clearly identified the 
role of the government in developing countries to develop capabilities to generate 
knowledge at home along with providing help to domestic agents of production to take 
advantage of the large global stock of knowledge. It is significant to note here that 
                                                 
9 Wade (1990); Srinivasan (1995). 
10 World Bank (1998).   17
UNDP has gone ahead in terms of identifying knowledge gaps existing between 
developed and developing countries and articulated the arguments against the strict 
intellectual property rights regime enacted and implemented by the WTO. Furthermore, 
UNDP has not only suggested an innovative and fundamental role for the governments 
of the developing countries in generating capabilities that matter for knowledge 
development, but has also identified knowledge as a global public good and the role of 
the international community in reducing the knowledge gaps.11  
 
Apart from making suitable public innovation policies to strengthen national innovation 
systems, the governments of developing countries should also strive hard to seek co-
operation amongst themselves as well as with the international institutions and agencies 
to negotiate in the WTO framework. Specifically, the negotiations should be with regard 
to MNC operations in their markets. They should also assess losses of domestic firms 
and seek compensation, using that to create capabilities to strengthen innovative 
infrastructure at home. The two-step strategy suggested above will go a long way to 
make capable domestic agents of production to catch up the spillover effects created by 
international capital and fill the knowledge gap for sustained economic growth. 
7 Conclusions 
The analysis of sources and indicators of innovations across countries and regions 
clearly shows some decrease in the concentration of innovations in the developed 
countries. East Asia has emerged as innovative region of technology development, with 
numerous lessons for developing countries in general and South Asian countries in 
particular in a fast globalizing world economy. The foremost lesson which should be 
learnt from the East Asian experience to succeed in the global economy is to reinvent 
the role of state to strengthen the national innovation institutional system. The 
developing countries are currently engaged in economic reforms to reduce the role of 
the state and provide larger space to market forces, which essentially make the state 
scarce in economic activities. This strategy of making the state scarce in developing 
countries suffers from the drawback of substitutability of the state and the market and 
reduces the competitiveness of the domestic agents of production in the international 
economy. It is important to note here that intervention of the state in a fast globalizing 
world economy is more difficult but at the same time is crucial and strategic. Therefore, 
reinventing the role of government policy in crafting national innovation institutional 
arrangements for building and strengthening competitive advantage is direly needed.  
 
The East Asian economies have grown in an environment of import substitution and lax 
intellectual property regimes which are no longer available to developing economies. 
Intellectual property regimes enacted and imposed by the WTO have been restricting 
                                                 
11 UNDP (2001); Stiglitz (1999).   18
developing economies put into place national innovation systems with proven adverse 
effects on global innovations and more particularly least developed countries (Grossman 
and Lai 2004; Helpman 1993). Developing country markets are invaded by 
multinational corporations without contributing towards generating domestic innovation 
capabilities. The role of international institutions is to evolve policies which should 
decrease the knowledge gap through imposing conditions on multinational corporations 
to contribute in an equal measure the percentage of sales revenue expenditure on R&D 
in the host country as in the home country. 
 
The reduction of fiscal deficits under the umbrella of reform programmes gives an easy 
option for developing country governments to cut down expenditure on institutions 
which are the backbone of economic development such as education, health and 
infrastructure. Further, curtailing support to the R&D institutions—public and private—
has a capacity to weaken the institutions which from a long-term perspective have great 
importance for economic growth and welfare. The right combination of state and market 
which delivers long-run growth is the correct strategy, rather than going from one 
extreme to another which in the past has introduced instability and blocked potential.  
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